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It was a sunny afternoon in early November 1961 
when detectives John Blazi and Harold Berg inter-
rupted Estelle Griswold at work. They were on a 
raid, looking for evidence that a long-standing Con-
necticut law was being violated. They found the 
proof they needed in Griswold's office on the second 
floor of a grand old mansion in New Haven, Con-
necticut. 
Griswold met the detectives at the top of the 
stairs and told them right away that, indeed, she 
was breaking the law. (She may even have greeted 
John Blazi by name; a few years earlier she had 
presented him with a civic award.) Then she took 
the detectives on a tour of the "criminal" operation 
that she was running. It was a Planned Parenthood 
center-a birth control clinic-and operating such a 
center was strictly illegal. 
Ms. Griswold, a stately woman in her early six-
ties, carefully pointed out the condoms and other 
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contraceptives they dispensed at the clinic- evi-
dence enough for an arrest to be made. As she 
showed them the center, Griswold told the detec-
tives that she hoped the law would be enforced so 
that she could challenge its validity before the U.S. 
Supreme Court. She said she welcomed arrest but 
would refuse to hand over patient records. "It was 
one of the easiest types of investigations you could 
get involved in," Berg recalled some years later. "It 
wasn't one of those investigations where you had to 
dig out the information .... It was sort of 'Here it 
is; here we are; take us in.' "1 
James Morris, the night manager of a nearby 
Avis Rent-A-Car agency, had informed the police. 
Morris, a forty-two-year-old Roman Catholic and 
the father of fiv~" called the police to complain as 
soon as he heard what Estelle Griswold was up to. 
"[It's] like a house of prostitution," he charged. 2 
Morris was persistent in purshing an official re-
sponse to Griswold's center. He contacted the Con-
necticut state police, the New Haven police, and 
the New Haven mayor. When Morris finally ap-
peared in person in the office of Julius Maretz, the 
circuit court prosecutor, Maretz agreed to request a 
police investigation into the clinic. 
Estelle Griswold's center was not a back-alley 
joint where unmarried girls paid a lot of money to 
avoid pregnancy. The clinic, clean and well run, was 
staffed by experienced doctors and nurses who pro-
vided contraception and family-planning advice to 
low-income married women. Patients were never 
charged more than fifteen dollars for visits, and 
services were much in demand. In the ten days the 
clinic was open, forty-two patients were seen and 
seventy-five more applied for appointments. When 
word of the police "raid" reached the patients who 
were in the clinic's examination rooms at the time, 
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one determined woman remarked, "We're going on 
a sit-down strike until we get what we came for."3 
Detectives Blazi and Berg left empty-handed 
that day, but they would return. James Morris con-
tinued his tirade, declaring "every moment the clin-
ic stays open another child is not born."4 The local 
press kept asking, "Will the state uphold the law?" 
Prosecutor Maretz declined to comment. 
One week later, on November 10, Judge J. 
Robert Lacey of the Sixth Circuit Court of Con-
necticut and Maretz issued arrest warrants for the 
clinic's executive director, Griswold, and medical di-
rector, Dr. Charles Lee Buxton. Griswold and Bux-
ton appeared voluntarily in New Haven police 
court and pleaded not guilty. The charges? Violat-
ing Connecticut laws that made the use of contra-
ceptives illegal and forbade citizens from assisting 
anyone in the commission of a crime. According to 
the arrest warrant, the defendants "did assist, 
abet, counsel, cause, and command certain married 
women to use any drug, medicinal article or instru-
ment for the purpose of preventing conception." 
After posting bail of $100, Griswold and Buxton 
were released. No fingerprints or mug shots had 
been taken. 
That same day, Planned Parenthood voluntarily 
closed the clinic. Morris must have been satisfied 
to see it close, but he vowed to remain vigilant. 
"It is against the natural law, which says marital 
relations are for procreation and not entertain-
ment .... Every time they try to open a birth-con-
trol clinic, I will force its closing, as long as the law 
is on the books." Morris felt strongly that the clinic 
had done "an awful lot of damage." Still, the lead-
ers of Planned Parenthood welcomed his attention. 
In the words of one official: "He fell right into 
our laps."5 
12 
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Est~lle Griswold (right) and C. Lee Buxton (center) 
are shown in police headquarters after their arrest 
for dispensing contraceptives in 1961. 
REASONS FOR THE STRUGGLE 
Even though birth control was illegal in Connecti-
cut, it was widely available. Many private doctors 
simply ignored the law and prescribed birth control 
for their patients. Drugstores filled the prescrip-
tions and sold condoms under the counter. Those 
Connecticut citizens able to travel to neighboring 
states, such as New York and Rhode Island, also 
had access to a full range of contraceptives and 
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family-planning services. Why, then, would people 
like Griswold and Buxton risk arrest to challenge 
the Connecticut law against contraception? 
First, the Connecticut law affected its citizens 
unequally, and the split, simply put, was along 
class and racial lines. Well-informed women or 
women who could afford to go to private doctors 
willing to break the law had access to birth control. 
Because clinics could not operate openly in the 
state-they could be charged with aiding and abet-
ting in the use of contraceptives-there were no 
low-cost family-planning facilities. As Harriet 
Pilpel, the general counsel for Planned Parenthood, 
put it: "The only way we could provide public access 
to contraception in those years was to have an un-
derground railroad, transporting women in station 
wagons to Rhode Island or New York to get contra-
ceptive materials."6 
Second, the Connecticut law was the most 
stringent in the United States. In 1929, twenty-
nine states had laws forbidding the dissemination 
of information about birth control. Because Con-
necticut outlawed the use, and not just the distri-
bution, of contraceptives, the law turned many 
ordinary married couples into criminal offenders. 
Moreover, like the laws of just nine other states-
Arizona, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Washington-
and the District of Columbia, the Connecticut law 
did not even allow for physicians to prescribe con-
traceptives when medically necessary to protect 
the health or the very lives of their patients. 
Finally, the law represented control by the state 
over one of the most personal decisions a couple 
can make: whether and when to have a child. How-
ever, because proving that someone had illegally 
used birth control was practically impossible, the 
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one Connecticut doctor put it, the law was "unen-
forceable short of having a policeman under every 
bed in the state."7 
Even if, in practice, the law did not prevent cou-
ples from using birth control, opponents of the law, 
such as Griswold and Buxton, resented the symbol-
ism of the state's outlawing so private a choice. 
They believed strongly that the law violated basic 
principles of fairness, autonomy, and privacy and 
could not be overlooked. 
A POWERFUL SYMBOL 
By 1961, birth control had a long history of creat-
ing controversy in the United States. The roots of 
the controversy were complex. Birth control was, 
for many, more than merely the prevention of con-
ception. ' 
For feminists and social reformers, birth control 
represented a way for women to achieve emancipa-
tion from the physical and economic burdens of 
having too many or unwanted children. ''Voluntary 
motherhood" was a revolutionary concept from the 
late 1800s that was meant to allow women to expe-
rience sexual freedom, remain in the workforce 
(and be economically independent from men if they 
chose), and take control of their lives. 
For many whites, the question of limiting the 
number of children that were born inevitably led to 
questions about the kind of families that would be 
smaller. In the early 1900s, no less a figure than 
U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt condemned the 
use of birth control as a selfish act by women who 
were unconcerned about the possibility of "race sui-
cide." This term was used by those who feared that 
the decrease in the size of white families would 
eventually lead to a nation populated by more non-
whites than whites. 
For nonwhites and poor women, there was 
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ample reason to be skeptical about the enthusiasm 
to provide them with birth control. Birth control 
agencies that linked poverty relief with family-
planning services, particularly when the govern-
ment was involved, raised suspicions that birth 
control supporters were more interested in control-
ling the size of nonwhite, working-class popula-
tions than in "emancipating" them. 
For the politically powerful Roman Catholic -
Church, birth control was, of course, immoral. The 
Church objects on moral grounds to all kinds of 
birth control except the "rhythm method." The 
rhythm method limits a couple's intercourse to 
those times when the woman is not ovulating and 
is thus less likely to become pregnant. A statement 
released in 1958 by the Archdiocese of New York 
explains this view: "The natural law commands 
that the married state, as ordained by God, fulfill 
the function of the conservation of the human race. 
Artificial birth control frustrates that purpose. It 
is, therefore, unnatural, since it is contrary to the 
nature and dignity of man in the exercise of his fac-
ulties and subverts the sacredness of marriage." 
_ By 1961, opposition to changing or repealing 
the Connecticut law came largely from legislators 
who either were Catholic themselves or did not 
want to offend their large Catholic constituencies. 
An article in Time magazine estimated that in the 
early 1960s about 46 percent of Connecticut's popu-
lation was Roman Catholic. In states such as Con-
necticut where the Church retained a dominant 
political presence, the fight over birth control took 
on great significance. State laws that followed 
Church teachings, such as the one that made birth 
control illegal, were evidence that the Church was 
still a powerful force. Reluctant to cede such au-
thority, the Church was one of the main opponents 
of legalized contraception. There were, as well, 
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members of the Catholic Church who agreed with 
those worried about "race suicide" and used this 
concern to support their position. 
With the potent symbolism so many people at-
tached to birth control, it is no wonder that the 
Connecticut law remained in effect so long. The law 
was not a popular one-as early as the 1930s, most 
of Connecticut's citizens favored legal birth con-
trol-but it was supported by powerful political 
forces. 
Some twenty-three attempts to reform or re-
peal the law were brought before the Connecticut 
legislature. Lawyers and birth control supporters 
also combined forces on several occasions to test 
the validity of the law in court. However, before 
Griswold v. Connecticut was decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, no one had been able to overturn 
the law. Indeed, just months before the arrest of 
Griswold and Buxton, the Supreme Court had dis-
missed a case challenging the constitutionality of 
the same Connecticut statute. In that case, Su-
preme Court justice Felix Frankfurter noted that 
although the law was still on the books, no one had 
been charged with violating it for years. Because 
there was no "fear of enforcement" of the law, there 
was also no reason to decide a case concerning its 
impact. The Supreme Court could not, he ex-
plained, "be umpire to debates concerning harm-
less, empty shadows."8 
By opening the New Haven clinic in November 
1961, Planned Parenthood set out to test whether 
the Connecticut law was merely an "empty shad-
ow." If it was, the clinic would be able to serve its 
clients without interference from the authorities. 
If, on the other hand, the law was enforced and ar-
rests made, birth control supporters would chal-
lenge the law before the Supreme Court of the 
United States. It was the best they could hope for. 
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